- Local Name: N/a
- Transliteration: N/a
- Alternatives: N/a
- Status: 2014 – 2016 Defeated
- Conflicts: Tunisian Islamist Militancy
The Islamic State’s Sabratha Network [DaISN] was a Tunisian branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [DaIISh; Dawlat al-Islamiya fi-Iraq wal ash-Sham]. It was based in the village of Ajaylat, near Sabratha in the Libyan Zawiya district.1 The DaISN was exclusively made up of Tunisian nationals.2 The group’s objective was to establish a Tunisian province of the DaIISh. At first it sought to destabilize Tunisia by carrying out large-scale attack against tourists and security forces.3 The DaISN later tried to conquer territory in the country.4 At its Sabratha base, the outfit trained large numbers of Tunisian jihadis.5 These elements often joined DaIISh branches in Libya or Iraq and Syria. Others were sent back to Tunisia where they linked up with local outfits.
History
The DaISN emerged out of the community of Tunisian jihadis that had established a presence in Libya since the 2011 revolution. Many of these elements had settled around the town of Sabratha just across the border. The covert military wing of the Partisans of Shari’a in Tunisia [AST; Ansar Achariaâ] used the area to train and shelter its operatives.6 In 2013, Tunisian jihadi Ahmed Rouissi tried to stage several attacks in Tunisia from Sabratha.7 Over time, the town became a major logistics hub for Tunisian jihadis traveling to Syria.
Most the Sabratha-based militants pledged loyalty to the DaIISh in 2014. Key operatives began to focus on launching attacks in Tunisia. They recruited fighters from the large numbers of Tunisian jihadis passing through Sabratha.8 These terrorists effectively formed new group which operated under the guidance of the DaIISh, but remained independent from the organization’s three official affiliates in Libya.9
Although the DaISN’s goal was to attack Tunisia, its members were sometimes involved in militant activities around Sabratha as well. The group not only attacked local opponents, it also targeted foreigners in the area. DaISN operatives were linked to the abduction and subsequent execution of a British oil worker and his girlfriend from New Zealand in January 2015.10 In November 2015, the group ambushed the convoy of the Serbian ambassador.11 Two Serbian diplomats were kidnapped by the attackers. Local police did not dare to move against the heavily armed Tunisian militants.12
In March 2015, two DaISN operatives attacked Europeans at an antiquities museum in Tunis.13 The assailants killed 23 people before they were eliminated by security forces. On Jun. 26, 2015, another DaISN terrorist shot and killed 38 tourists in an attack in the Port el-Kantaoui resort town.14 These incidents devastated Tunisia’s tourism sector. The attacks also opened a new front in the DaIISh’s international campaign of terror. In November 2015, the DaISN dispatched the suicide terrorist who killed twelve members of the presidential guard in a suicide bomb attack on their bus in the Tunisian capital city.15
Encouraged by these successes, the DaISN started planning even more spectacular attacks. After intelligence revealed that a large-scale attack was imminent, the American military launched an air strike against the group’s main compound in Sabratha on Feb. 19, 2016.16 Senior leader Noureddine Chouchane and more than forty other members of the outfit were eliminated in the incident. The outfit’s two Serbian hostages also died in the strike.17 Libyan militias took advantage of the DaISN’s setback to attack its base.18 Operatives of the network fled their former stronghold. Senior leader Jihad Chandoul and a number of his men were captured by the Libyans.19
Despite this severe blow, the DaISN launched the Mar. 07, 2016 incursion into Ben Guerdane.20 Dozens of jihadis attacked security forces in an attempt to conquer the town. The Tunisian authorities were able to repel the attack and killed many of the assailants. Over the course of the following days, other DaISN operatives were eliminated or captured across southern Tunisia.
The DaISN was unable to recover from its heavy losses and fell into complete disarray. Remaining leaders went their separate ways. A significant number of the group’s cadres have reportedly joined the Soldiers of the Caliphate in Tunisia [JaKI; Jund al-Khilafa fi-Ifriqiya].21
Leadership
The DaISN appears to have been very loosely structured. As a result, several senior members shared leadership over the network. Jihad Chandoul reportedly ran the DaISN’s daily affairs.22 The charismatic Noureddine Chouchane apparently organized the group’s campaign of terror against Tunisia.23 Influential Tunisian jihadis Moez Fezzani and Ahmed Rouissi also wielded considerable influence over the network.24
Linkages
The DaISN operated as an official branch of the DaIISh. It acted as the organization’s special operations wing in Tunisia. Although the DaISN was linked to Libya’s DaIISh affiliates, it operated completely independently.25 Senior network operatives Ahmed Rouissi and Moez Fezzani served as commanders in the Islamic State’s Province of Tripoli [DaIT; Dawlat al-Islamiya Wilayat Tarabulus].26
The DaISN was also connected to DaIISh-affiliated groups operating in Tunisia. It appears to have maintained a close relationship with the JaKI. The DaISN reportedly trained many of its cadres at its camp in Sabratha.27 The network was also in contact with operatives of the Brigade of the Criterion [KeF: Katibat el-Forqane] which carried out several attacks in the Sousse governorate in 2015.28
References