- Local Name: كتائب الفرقان
- Transliteration: Kata’eb al-Furqan
- Alternatives: N/a
- Status: 2013 – 2013 (Merged into ABaM)
- Conflicts: Islamist Militancy in Egypt
The Brigades of the Criterion [KaF; Kataeb al-Furqan] was a small jihadi group that emerged in Egypt after the army started cracking down on Islamism in the summer of 2013. It was responsible for several high-profile attacks. After a few months, the group merged with other militants and disappeared.
Historical Overview
The KaF was formed immediately after the Egyptian army deposed Islamist president Mohammed Morsi in July 2013.1 It was set up by former university professor Mohammed Nasser and several other radicalized supporters of Islamist presidential election candidate Hazem Abu Ismail.2 These men objected to political Islamism and had been preparing to wage jihad for several months.3
On Jul. 29, 2013, the KaF carried out its first attack when some of its operatives fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a cargo ship sailing through the Suez Canal.4 In August, its fighters attacked the security forces in a number of small-scale attacks.5 Around the same time, KaF operatives also embarked on a campaign of terrorism and sabotage in Ismailiya.6 On Aug. 14, they killed an army colonel in the city.7 KaF militants again fired a rocket at a ship traversing the Suez Canal on Aug. 31. This attack was covered extensively by the international press.8 The outfit continued its operations against the security forces over the next months. On Sep. 17, 2013, KaF fighters ambushed a military vehicle and killed three soldiers in Salheya, in the Sharqiya governorate.9 Six soldiers died when the group attacked their car in another attack in Sharqiya on Oct. 07.10 That same day, a group of KaF operatives launched a rocket at a satellite communications facility in Cairo’s Ma’adi neighborhood.11
In late 2013, the KaF merged into the Partisans of the Holy House [ABaM; Ansar Bait al-Maqdis]. Nasser and his men had long rejected overtures by the ABaM, but its chief Tawfiq Ziada eventually managed to change their minds.12 Nasser was appointed to the ABaM’s leadership council.13 Other KaF members also became full-fledged members of the group, although they apparently continued to operate in separate cells.
By the end of 2013, the Egyptian authorities began rounding up cadres of the former KaF. Two of its members were arrested by security forces in November.14 On Dec. 29, 2013, three of its operatives were apprehended in Arish.15 In January and February 2014, the authorities captured at least eight more cadres of the outfit in a series of operations in Ismailiya and North Sinai.16 At the time of their arrests, some of these elements were planning high-profile attacks throughout Egypt.17 Other former KaF members were later caught during the infamous operation by security forces in Abu Sharkas.18 Most of these militants were later sentenced to death. In May 2015, the Egyptian government hanged several of them.19
Objectives & Strategy
The KaF sought end military rule in Egypt and establish an Islamic state in the country.20 It believed its goals could only be achieved through violence. The outfit publicly chided the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists for their participation in Egypt’s political process.21
Cadre Strength
The KaF had dozens of members. It was well-armed and most of its key operatives had received training in the Gaza Strip.22 The group recruited several minors. In March 2014, one of these elements tried to blow himself up at a security forces’ installation in Arish.23
Area of Operations
The KaF was based in the North Sinai governorate from where it launched operations elsewhere in Egypt. The group also established cells in Giza, Ismailiya and Qahira.24 The group carried out attacks in the capital region, the Nile Delta and along the Suez Canal. The KaF’s role in the insurgency on the Sinai Peninsula remains unclear.
Modus Operandi
The KaF mainly targeted Egypt’s security forces.25 It was also focused on operations that generated publicity. KaF operatives twice attacked ships traveling on the Suez Canal and targeted a satellite relay station in Cairo used by many Egyptian television stations. The group was careful to avoid civilian casualties. It refrained from bombings and instead relied on firearms and rocket-propelled grenades.26
Public Relations
The KaF devoted considerable attention to its public relations. It regularly released video footage of its attacks. The national and international press gave considerable coverage to the outfit’s operations.27
External Linkages
The KaF was linked to the Islamic Resistance Movement [HAMAS; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya]. Nasser and his associates had long maintained contacts with the Gaza-based movement. In 2012, they had already visited training camps of the HAMAS in the Gaza Strip.28 HAMAS later offered financial support and provided weapons and explosives.29 Senior HAMAS commanders Raed Attar and Ayman Nofal appear to have been in charge of relations with the KaF.30
Cadres of the KaF supported the al-Qa’ida movement.31 They also maintained close links to the Sinai-based ABaM. In the fall of 2013, the KaF merged into the ABaM.32 The group’s former members later formed an important section of the ABaM’s wing in mainland Egypt.
References