• Local Name: N/a
  • Transliteration: N/a
  • Alternatives: N/a
  • Status: 2016 – 2017 Dormant
  • Conflicts: Egyptian Islamist Militancy

The Islamic State in Egypt’s Ibrahim & Kassem Network [DaIM-IK] was an Egyptian branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [DaIISh; Dawlat al-Islamiya fi-Iraq wal ash-Sham]. Its objective was to destabilize the country by weakening state control and fomenting religious conflict so it could establish a so-called province of the DaIISh in Egypt.1 The DaIM-IK was known for its virulent hatred of Egypt’s Coptic community. It vowed to wipe out the country’s Christians and was responsible for the some of the deadliest attacks against the community.2

Amr Ibrahim and Mohab Kassem served as the two leaders of the DaIM-IK. Both men were recognized by the central leadership of the DaIISh.3 Ibrahim wielded the most influence. He headed the network’s activities in Upper Egypt, oversaw recruitment and training and directed most of its attacks.4 Kassem served as the leader of the DaIM-IK’s cells in Qahira.5 The network had dozens of members. Some of these cadres were former supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood who had radicalized in the face of the Egyptian government’s crackdown on Islamists.6 A significant share of the DaIM-IK’s operatives were trained by DaIISh affiliates in Libya. Others were instructed in Syria.7

The DaIM-IK’s cells were based in Upper Egypt and the Greater Cairo region. Most of the group’s members came from the Qena governorate, where the network ran makeshift training camps and a string of safe houses.8 It also had a presence in the governorates of Asiyut and Sohag. North Sinai was used as an operational staging ground for the DaIM-IK’s Qahira-based militants.9 Network operatives were also active in Egypt’s western deserts where they robbed smugglers to raise funds.10

The DaIM-IK maintained direct ties with the central leadership of the DaIISh through Egyptian jihadis who had joined the organization in Iraq and Syria.11 The network was also deeply tied to the Islamic State’s Province of Sinai [DaIWS; Dawlat al-Islamiya Wilayat Sina’a]. The DaIWS helped the DaIM-IK during its formation and gave logistical support.12 The network was also linked to the DaIISh’s Libyan branches which provided funds, training and weapons.13

Historical Overview

The DaIM-IK was formed somewhere in 2016 when Amr Ibrahim transformed his group of followers into a DaIISh affiliate. He apparently sprung into action following a visit to DaIWS leaders in the Sinai in the beginning of the year.14 Ibrahim had long recruited and trained jihadis in the Qena governorate.15 His men were reinforced by Mohab Kassem and his associates in Qahira. Kassem too had spent time with senior DaIWS operatives in the months preceding the formation of the DaIM-IK.16

On Dec. 11, 2016, one of the DaIM-IK’s members blew himself up at a church in Qahira, killing 29 people.17 The DaIISh subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack and the operation featured prominently in the organization’s propaganda.18 The Egyptian government immediately tried to clamp down on the outfit. A few days after the attack, security forces raided a hideout in the capital’s Zeitun suburb and arrested four of the group’s members.19 Four other terrorists were apprehended in another operation in early January 2017.20 Although these arrests disrupted Kassem’ cells in the capital city, Ibrahim’s men in Upper Egypt escaped unharmed.

In January 2017, these DaIM-IK operatives attacked a police checkpoint in Naqab.21 Eight officers were killed in the incident. On Apr. 09, the group carried out the coordinated suicide bombings on churches in Iskandariya and Tanta that killed a combined 48 people.22 Following these attacks, security forces arrested dozens of members of the DaIM-IK. The network’s key operatives escaped capture. Although its capabilities were severely degraded, the DaIM-IK remained active.23 On May 26, 2017, its members shot and killed 29 Christians after having stopped a bus carrying visitors from a monastery in the Minya governorate.24

Over the next months, the Egyptian authorities eliminated dozens of DaIM-IK members during operations in the governorates of Asiyut and Qena. On Jun. 22, seven of its cadres were killed during a raid in Asiyut.25 In July 2017, it lost six militants when police forces stormed their hideout in Dayruth. In the face of the government’s onslaught, the DaIM-IK’s operations were significantly scaled down. In August 2017, DaIM-IK fighters killed two policemen manning a security checkpoint in Esna.26 No further attacks have been attributed to the network.

Despite the Egyptian government’s crackdown on the DaIM-IK, its key operatives, including Ibrahim and Kassem, have avoided capture. Their current status and whereabouts remain unknown. Since the summer of 2017, the authorities have brought charges against more than thirty network members in custody.27 Seventeen other DaIM-IK militants are wanted by the government.

References[+]